Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Conditional: A conditional in logic is a statement that asserts a relationship between two propositions, typically in an "if-then" format. It states that if the antecedent is true, then the consequent must also be true. In contrast to (purely formal) implication, the conditional refers to the content of the propositions. See also Implication._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Bas van Fraassen on Conditional - Dictionary of Arguments
I 118 Conditional/truth value/Fraassen: the truth value of the conditional is partly context-dependent. >Truth values, >Context. But science does not imply that the context is either way somehow - therefore science implies counterfactual conditionals at most in the limiting case where a conditional has the same truth value in all contexts - in this case the theory plus antecedent (conditions) strictly implies the consequent. Then also the laws of attenuation and contraposition apply - but then they are useless for our task to provide an explanation. >Explanations._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-27